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ABSTRACT 
An emerging literature shows how the mass arrival of refugees induces both short- and long-term 
consequences to hosting countries. The main contribution of this paper is to conduct a selective review of this 
literature from a food-security and resilience perspective. First, the paper identifies a number of direct and 
indirect food-security consequences of hosting refugees. It provides a conceptual framework for discussing 
these various channels through which refugee inflows influence food security in the hosting countries. In the 
short run, violence, environmental degradation, and disease propagation are risks, with indirect implications 
for food security, while the long-run channels include changes in infrastructure, trade, and labor markets, as 
well as competition for resources. Second, the literature review finds that the impact of large-scale influxes of 
refugees on host communities and on their food security is unequally distributed among the local population. 
Locals with better ex ante access to resources, education, and political connections are more likely to benefit 
as a result of refugee inflows, while the disadvantaged become increasingly vulnerable. In the short run, 
humanitarian aid (for example, food aid) is the usual global response, with varying impact on the food security 
and resilience of host countries. Effectiveness of the humanitarian aid depends, however, on its nature and on 
the country context, both of which need careful consideration. In the long run, humanitarian aid should pave 
the way for development. In particular, investments such as improving road infrastructure and fostering trade 
with refugees’ countries of origin are strategies worth exploring for enhancing resilience and transitioning 
toward development. Finally, we stress the need for more research on the consequences of refugees and 
alternative polices on food security and resilience in host communities. 
Keywords: protracted refugee situations, humanitarian assistance, food security, refugee policy, resilience 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Every year, thousands of people flee their country or region of origin due to civil unrest. These movements of 
masses in order to escape violence have increasingly been recognized as a major global phenomenon. After 
World War II, the newly established United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) recognized the 
existence of 400,000 refugees. The decolonization period as well as the resurgence of civil wars after the end 
of the Cold War led to a rapid increase in the number of people seeking protection in foreign countries, 
including the mass flight of Kurds from northern Iraq, refugees fleeing interethnic violence in former 
Yugoslavia, and the more than 2 million Rwandans fleeing to former Zaire, Tanzania, Burundi, and Uganda in 
1994. More recently, repeated violence, combined with the severe drought in 2011, is responsible for more 
than 1 million Somali refugees, who are hosted in their neighboring countries (Kenya, Ethiopia, Yemen, 
Djibouti, or Eritrea). The civil war in Syria has also been followed by massive flows of refugees, hosted mainly 
in neighboring Turkey, Lebanon, Jordan, or Iraq. These events, among others, have resulted in a population of 
more than 8 million refugees in developing countries (UNHCR 2012b). Moreover, people that flee from 
violence in their place of birth do not always cross international borders but instead become internally 
displaced persons (IDPs). In 2012, the population of IDPs amounted to 17 million, largely concentrated in 
Afghanistan, Colombia, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Iraq, Pakistan, Somalia, Sudan, and South Sudan 
(UNHCR 2012b). 
Developed countries have recognized the severity of refugee situations by allocating humanitarian aid as a 
policy response. Such humanitarian aid can be directed either to the country of origin, in the hope of 
addressing the root causes of forced migration (Czaika and Mayer 2011), or to the refugee host country as an 
act of burden sharing (Morel 2009), or to both. Paradoxically, both proponents and opponents of providing 
humanitarian assistance to address refugee situations blame refugees for being a burden on their host 
country. Refugees interact with their host economies in various ways and can have far-reaching consequences 
on their local hosts. One negative consequence—the one most often cited—is the threat that refugees pose to 
the food security of host countries. Because civil wars can be long lasting, most refugees are likely to reside in 
host countries for protracted periods, implying significant long-lasting impacts on host communities and their 
food security. Furthermore, most refugees are hosted in neighboring countries that do not necessarily face 
better economic conditions and often have preexisting food insecurity. This may place a further burden on 
hosting populations and may erode their resilience to withstand shocks and achieve food security over time. 
The purpose of this paper is to present a selective review of the interdisciplinary literature on the impacts 
of refugees on host communities’ food security and resilience. The main aim is to draw policy insights from the 
selected literature for enhancing the resilience of host communities to better address food-security and 
nutrition challenges in protracted refugee situations. Much of the review is restricted to food-security impacts 
in host communities, which has not received the attention it deserves in policymaking circles. In addition, 
there is a growing evidence base on the impacts of refugees on host communities, which could inform 
policymakers about policy options for enhancing resilience and food security in protracted refugee situations. 
Furthermore, the focus on refugee impacts on the food security of host populations allows us to highlight key 
research gaps that we believe offer promising avenues for research on policies and interventions to promote 
resilience in host communities and improve the food security of host populations in protracted refugee 
situations. The paper is not a systematic review (see, for example, White and Waddington 2012). Rather, it is a 
selective review paper that draws mainly on well-known quantitative studies supplemented with qualitative 
evidence where deemed necessary. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 explores the regional trends in the estimated 
refugee population and links them with food insecurity. We document a strong correlation between the size of 
the refugee population and food security but argue against interpretations in which refugee inflows pose a 
universal threat to food security in receiving countries. Instead we call for a conceptual framework through 
which to analyze the consequences of population shocks on food security in hosting countries. In Section 3, we 
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present such a conceptual framework that discusses the multiple channels through which refugees may 
influence the food security, resilience, or both of the host population. The different components of that 
framework are discussed briefly and then linked to case-study evidence from Africa south of the Sahara (SSA). 
We also discuss studies that have quantitatively estimated the impacts of refugees on host communities using 
cross-country data. Based on our assessment of the existing literature through the lens of food security, in 
Section 4 we discuss the solutions usually proposed to deal with protracted refugee situations. Section 5 
concludes with some policy recommendations and areas of promising research for moving the resilience 
agenda forward to strengthen the resilience of hosting populations under a protracted refugee situation. 
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2. REFUGEES AND FOOD SECURITY: A MISLEADING CORRELATION 
At the end of 2012, the refugee population throughout the world was estimated to be almost 10 million. While 
the total number of refugees has not increased substantially during the last five years, the population of IDPs 
grew by 29 percent, to a total of more than 17 million (UNHCR 2012b). The stock of IDPs grew especially in 
Asia and the Pacific, the Middle East and North Africa, and Central Africa and the Great Lakes because of 
renewed displacement due to conflict (UNHCR 2012b). The majority of both the refugee and IDP populations 
reside in developing countries. One out of three refugees in developing countries is hosted in SSA, mainly 
originating from three conflict-riddled countries: Somalia (799,300), Sudan (527,800), and the DRC (476,500) 
(UNHCR 2012b). Moreover, during the last five years the refugee population in SSA increased by 20 percent 
(Table 2.1), largely as a result of drought-related emergencies and armed conflicts in the Horn of Africa and 
West Africa (UNHCR 2012b). Especially alarming is the deteriorating refugee situation in the Horn of Africa, 
which faced a staggering doubling of the number of refugees in the last five years, while it already hosts a large 
proportion of the long-term refugees.  
Table 2.1 Refugee and internally displaced populations by region, 2007 and 2012 
UNHCR/UN region 
Refugees IDPs 
2007 2012 5-yr change 2007 2012 
5-yr 
change 
Persons (x 1,000) (percent) Persons (x 1,000) (percent) 
Total world 9,680 9,882 2 13,740 17,671 29 
Developing countries 7,599 7,567 0 9,215 12,516 36 
   Africa south of the Sahara 2,271 2,749 21 5,889 6,985 19 
     Central Africa and Great Lakes 1,100 479 –56 1,694 2,800 65 
     East and Horn of Africa 815 1,867 129 3,486 3,854 11 
     Southern Africa 181 135 –26 – 58 – 
     West Africa 175 268 53 709 273 –61 
   Middle East and North Africa 2,654 1,519 –43 2,533 3,593 42 
   Asia and Pacific 2,674 3,299 23 793 1,938 144 
Developed countries 2,081 2,315 11 4,525 5,155 14 
   Americas 500 515 3 3,000 3,944 31 
   Europe 1,581 1,799 14 1,525 1,211 –21 
Sources: UNHCR (2007, 2012b). 
Notes: IDP = internally displaced person; UNHCR = United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The above figures do 
not include people in refugee-like situations as defined by the UNHCR and obviously do not capture the surge in Syrian 
refugees in the Middle East after 2012. 
Large population movements tend to be initiated in countries suffering from (civil) war and political 
instability or induced by shocks and changes in the environment (Black 2001; Moore and Shellman 2007; 
Marchiori, Maystadt, and Schumacher 2013). Most forced migrants that cross international borders are hosted 
in their neighboring countries, where they do not necessarily face better economic or environmental 
conditions (Hatton and Williamson 2003). Moreover, contrary to forced migration originating from natural 
disasters, the long-lasting and repeatable nature of civil conflicts means that refugees are likely to stay for a 
relatively long time in their countries of asylum. As a consequence, refugee situations have become 
increasingly protracted, with many refugees holding their refugee status for more than five years with little 
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prospect of returning to their country of origin in the near future.1 At the end of 2012, 6.4 million refugees 
(about 70 percent of the total refugee population) were in a protracted situation (UNHCR 2012b). 
There is no doubt that such large movements and settlements of refugees have a far-reaching impact on 
the host country. Several case studies illustrate that the recent influx of refugees is associated with high levels 
of food insecurity in Liberia (WFP 2011, 2013a, 2013b); in Burkina Faso, Chad, Liberia, and Niger (FAO 2013); 
and in the neighboring countries of Syria (ACTED 2013). All these policy documents link refugees with 
deteriorating food-security status of the host community, possibly related to increased pressure on natural 
resources, disruptions in the food and labor markets, and deteriorating health services. Nonetheless, 
anecdotal evidence does not provide an adequate basis to claim that refugees place a burden on the food 
security of host communities. The studies cited above are qualitative and descriptive in nature and are short 
on presenting an appropriate counterfactual for drawing causality inferences.  
At the global level, the link between food security and refugees suggested by cross-country correlation 
shows that countries that receive a high number of refugees largely coincide with areas already facing 
deteriorating food security. For example, Figure 2.1 shows a positive geographic relationship between food 
insecurity status, measured as the prevalence of child stunting, and refugee populations hosted by destination 
countries. Interestingly, such a correlation is likely to influence the political discourse surrounding refugees. A 
similar map was indeed used in the 1990s by heads of states and governments or their representatives at the 
World Food Summit to conclude that “Major refugee movements can cause food-security problems both 
among the refugees themselves and in the receiving areas” (UNHCR, quoted in FAO 1996, sect. 15).2 However, 
it is not surprising to find a strong association between refugee hosting and negative socioeconomic outcomes, 
given that the overwhelming majority of refugees are hosted in neighboring developing countries. Such a 
correlation tells us little about the causal impact of refugees on the food security of the hosts. 
Figure 2.1 Refugees by destination and prevalence of child stunting, 2005–2012 
 
Source: UNHCR (2012b) and von Grebmer et al. (2013).  
Note: Missing data for child stunting are reported for Somalia. 
1 UNHCR defines a protracted refugee situation as “one in which 25,000 or more refugees of the same nationality have 
been in exile for five years or longer in a given asylum country” (2012b, 23). The most protracted refugee situation 
currently occurs in Pakistan among the Afghan refugees (whose population is estimated to be about 2.6 million). 
2 Such a map was based on 1996 figures and is given in the appendix (Figure A.1). Despite an apparent lack of strong 
correlation, it illustrates how weak evidence may enter and influence the political debate. We can also show a similar 
picture based on the most recent data from the Global Hunger Index (Figure A.2 in the appendix). 
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More generally, cross-country correlation cannot claim causality because it does not take into account 
various confounding factors that drive part of the correlation. The effects of such confounding factors can be 
shown in simple graphical representations, as in Figure 2.2. The correlation between refugee population (in 
natural logarithm) and food insecurity as measured by the prevalence of child malnutrition is shown for the 
period 1960–2008. The left panel of Figure 2.2 suggests that hosting refugees is positively related with the 
prevalence of child stunting. The right panel of Figure 2.2 shows the correlation of the residuals of refugee 
population and the incidence of malnutrition in the host country, using country-demeaned values of each 
variable. We thereby remove all unobserved effects that do not vary over time and are fixed within a country 
(such as climate, historical ties, political orientation, and so on). As a consequence, the positive correlation 
between the refugee influx and food security disappears. Without further investigation at a more 
disaggregated level, it is difficult to assess whether this phenomenon points to a lack of systematic evidence of 
the impact of refugees’ inflows on the food security of the local hosts or to a standard aggregation problem 
because the impact of refugees is likely to be diluted in national statistics in cross-country analyses.  
Figure 2.2 Correlation between child stunting and natural logarithm of refugee population, 1960–2008 
  
Source: Authors’ calculation using refugee population data from UNHCR (2012b) and child stunting data from World Bank 
(2013). Due to the large number of missing values on child malnutrition, we use the interpolation technique based on 
nutrition-growth elasticities as described by Breisinger et al. (2012). 
Notes: Prevalence of child malnutrition (stunting) is measured as the percentage of children under age five whose height 
for age is more than 2 standard deviations below the sex- and age-specific median for the international reference 
population (World Bank 2013). The left panel indicates the raw correlation and the right panel shows the correlation of the 
residuals of child stunting and refugee population net of country fixed effects. Similar patterns are observed if the time 
fixed effects are also removed in the right panel. Similar conclusions are drawn when the interpolation technique is not 
used or when refugee data are taken from the alternative Polity IV dataset on forcibly displaced populations. 
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Finally, cross-country analyses cannot identify clear mechanisms that drive the correlation between the 
refugee population and food security. It should be recognized that refugees interact in a complex way with 
their host community and, in turn, affect food security through various direct and indirect channels. Hence, the 
association between refugees and food insecurity should be reassessed in a more holistic manner, and there is 
a need for a conceptual framework that considers several channels. This paper aims to take stock of the 
evidence on the refugee–food security link by providing a coherent review and synthesis of the studies that 
focus on various channels and policy options for addressing protracted refugee situations. The next section 
provides a conceptual framework and makes use of it to review the existing studies on the causes and impacts 
of refugees in the host communities. 
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3. CAUSES AND IMPACTS OF REFUGEES IN HOST COMMUNITIES: REVIEWING THE 
LITERATURE THROUGH A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
As the refugee crises in different parts of the world unfold, it is important to understand how these mass 
movements of refugees influence their host communities at the economic, social, environmental, and security 
levels. This section provides a conceptual framework to explore how a sudden inflow of refugees may affect 
the food security and resilience of a host community, in a developing-country context. It primarily explores the 
potential impacts of refugee inflows through the lens of food security, so this work is complementary to that of 
Alix-Garcia, Bartlett, and Saah (2012). However, it does not aim to assess the net effects of refugee or IDP 
inflows, because it does not take into account the food-security impacts on refugees (this is done by, for 
example, Hynes et al. 2002; Kondylis 2008; Ruiz and Vargas-Silva 2013; and Verwimp and Muñoz-Mora 2013) 
or IDPs themselves (Ibáñez and Vélez 2008; Adelman, Gilligan, and Lehrer 2010; Ibáñez and Moya 2010; Fiala 
2012; Rahim, Jaimovich, and Ylönen 2013). This section further discusses the importance of coping strategies, 
the expected short-term versus long-term effects (including when refugees repatriate), and the distributional 
consequences on the hosting population.  
Figure 3.1 applies an extended framework of food security. The mass influx of refugees shapes the 
dimensions (in bold) and subdimensions (in italics) of food security in various ways. The first three components 
of food security refer to a narrow definition, emphasizing the availability, accessibility, and utilization of food. 
Food availability is determined by domestic food production, commercial food imports (and hence transport 
costs) and food aid (FAO 2006). Food accessibility refers to the ability of a household to produce or purchase 
food needed by all household members (Ecker and Breisinger 2012). Food accessibility is largely determined by 
food prices and household resources (Hoddinott 2012) as well as transportation infrastructure. Household 
characteristics such as level of education and health status are likely to affect both food availability (through 
food production) and food accessibility (through earning potential and consequent food consumption). As the 
third dimension, household and within-household preferences determine food utilization, which refers to an 
individual’s dietary intake and his or her ability to absorb nutrients (Pieters, Guariso, and Vandeplas 2013). The 
optimal intake of food within a household is influenced by gender equality (Shroff et al. 2011; Duflo 2012) and 
depends on norms and habits (Atkin 2013). The ability to absorb nutrients is also determined by the 
individual’s level of education and health status (Robeyns 2006). 
So far the above description is limited to the determinants of food-security status. Ecker and Breisinger 
(2012) and Pieters, Guariso, and Vandeplas (2013) rightly acknowledged the importance of food-security 
stability as well as the potential overlap in food-security dimensions. Stability refers to the capacity of the 
household to cope with a shock (vulnerability) and to recover from it over time (resilience). For presentation 
purposes, we pool these two terms under resilience and will discuss the various risk-coping strategies 
households in the hosting economies may adopt in the face of massive inflows of refugees. The term resilience 
is therefore understood as the ability of people, communities, countries, and global institutions to prevent, 
anticipate, prepare for, cope with, and recover from shocks and not only bounce back to where they were 
before the shocks occurred but become even better off (adapted based on IFPRI 2020 policy consultation). 
Pieters, Guariso, and Vandeplas (2013) also warned that it is difficult to distinguish between the different 
components, for example to differentiate food availability from accessibility. A price increase, an issue of 
particular interest in the present review, would affect both availability and accessibility in very different ways 
depending on whether the household is a net food seller or buyer (Singh, Squire, and Strauss 1986). By 
construction, such a conceptual framework is therefore a simplified representation of a complex reality. 
Despite this limitation, we believe that the framework constitutes a useful tool to assess the different channels 
through which mass inflows of refugees could affect the hosting population. The following subsections discuss 
these channels through which refugee inflows affect food security, starting with the most direct impacts on 
food security. The next subsections focus on the health (Section 3.1), the security and conflict (Section 3.2), 
and the environmental (Section 3.3) channels. The discussion then turns to more indirect, but no less 
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Figure 3.1 Conceptualizing the impact of refugees on food security in host communities
 
Source: Adapted from Pieters, Guariso, and Vandeplas (2013). 
Notes: SR = short-run (at least at the peak of the refugee presence); LR = long-run (for example, several years after the refugees have left). 
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important, impacts on food security. Section 3.4 investigates the impact of refugee inflows on local 
production, transportation, and trade, while Sections 3.5 and 3.6 discuss the implications on prices and labor 
markets, respectively, and the impact of these on households’ food security. 
3.1 HEALTH 
The earnings capacity of a household, and thereby its food security, depends critically on the health of its adult 
members (see, for example, Beegle 2005). Because incomes in rural areas depend largely on labor-intensive 
agricultural production, the health status of the household might be vulnerable to the influx of refugees 
through various health-related channels. First, refugee inflows put pressure on the health system of the host 
community inasmuch as refugee movements have been associated with the spread of infectious diseases 
(Kalipeni and Oppong 1998) and especially with the diffusion of malaria (Kazmi and Pandit 2001; Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol 2007). If refugee inflows increase the prevalence of infectious disease (for example, malaria or 
HIV), this increase is likely to lower the earnings of agricultural households and may also suppress the overall 
availability of food in the refugee-hosting areas. Second, the movement of refugees originating from countries 
suffering from war may lead to conflict spillover effects into the host country (Akokpari 1998; Salehyan and 
Gleditsch 2006; Blattman and Miguel 2010), which would then have negative consequences on the host 
country’s health system. Third, another potential negative health impact includes the deterioration of the local 
health infrastructure (Kalipeni and Oppong 1998). 
Unfortunately, the evidence on the impact of refugee influxes on adult health outcomes in the hosting 
areas is almost nonexistent. At the global level, the study by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2007) is often 
presented as supportive evidence of the negative consequences of refugees on the host country (see, for 
example, Bosker and Garretsen 2009; Baez 2011; and Barreca, Fishback, and Kantor 2012). Montalvo and 
Reynal-Querol (2007) found that the spread of malaria in host countries occurs through the movement of 
refugees (for each 1,000 refugees there are between 2,000 and 2,700 cases of malaria). This effect, however, is 
statistically significant only when the sample is restricted to the tropical countries but not when the entire 
sample of refugee-hosting countries is used. The focus on refugees who come from tropical countries excludes 
about two-thirds of the refugee population, and because those from tropical countries represent a particular 
type of refugee it is difficult to generalize this finding. Another problematic issue is the focus on one particular 
outcome: the incidence of malaria. First, this health outcome is highly sensitive to measurement error because 
it is inherently difficult to identify individuals diagnosed with malaria (Vosti 1990; Gallup and Sachs 2000). 
Second, weather shocks, often shared by the origin and host country, not only are linked with malaria 
outbreaks (for example, Craig, Snow, and le Sueur 1999) but may also trigger conflicts (Hsiang, Burke, and 
Miguel 2013) and thus refugee inflows. Such omitted factors make the interpretation of the impact of refugee 
shocks on malaria outbreaks difficult to study. 
Case studies may shed more light on the health channel and the implications of forced migration on 
healthcare provision in host communities. The change in basic healthcare provision indirectly affects food 
security because changes in adult health have implications for households’ earning capacity. A mass arrival of 
refugees typically imposes a heavy burden on healthcare spending in host countries and on the capacity of the 
existing healthcare facilities in the receiving areas, which are often already struggling to provide adequate 
services to the local communities (Whitaker 2002). The host government’s financial and administrative 
capacity to manage the sudden increase in demand for health services largely determines the impact on 
healthcare provision. For example, during the Rwandan refugee crisis the Tanzanian government was much 
better equipped to handle the shock to its healthcare system than was its Zairean (now DRC) counterpart (see 
anecdotal evidence in Porignon et al. 1995; Goyens et al. 1996; and Whitaker 2002).  
Occasionally, refugee-assistance programs may lead to inequality in healthcare access between refugees 
and hosts when implemented in parallel to the host government’s services. Orach and De Brouwere (2004) 
showed that refugees had better access to health services than the rural host population in northern Uganda. 
These inequalities have also been shown to be detrimental to refugee-host relations (Lawrie and Van Damme 
9 
 
2003). However, host communities may benefit from improved health services when host and refugee health 
services are integrated (Orach and De Brouwere 2004) or when health services provided in the camps are also 
made available to the local hosts. Van Damme and colleagues (1998) showed that in Guinea, the refugee-
assistance program actually improved the health system through strengthening of health capacity and 
transportation infrastructure. In contrast to the quantitative evidence given by Baez (2011), fieldwork 
observations by Maystadt and Verwimp (forthcoming) also report health services to have improved following 
the refugee inflows in Tanzania. Meanwhile in Kenya, host communities reported having better access to 
health services, education facilities, and transportation since the establishment of the refugee camps 
(NORDECO 2010). Such cases encourage positive perceptions of refugee presence in host communities and 
promote harmonious refugee-host relationships (Orach and De Brouwere 2004). 
Child health is another important development outcome affected by various factors, including refugee 
presence and household food security. Long-run effects of refugee hosting on child health can be assessed by 
analyzing changes in human capital indicators such as height. In the case of the Kagera region in Tanzania, Baez 
(2011) studied the effect of the presence of Rwandan refugees on children’s height and found that it was 
associated with worsening child height and a significant increase in the prevalence of child morbidity and child 
mortality among the host communities. Baez (2011) hypothesized that this impact was due to an increase in 
the prevalence of infectious diseases and vector-borne illnesses or in the competition for various resources 
(labor, food, land, and wood) caused by the arrival of refugees.3 One caveat in the Baez study is that at the 
time he did not observe the final adult height of the children studied, only their height in puberty or just 
before onset of puberty.4 Recent studies in human biology, however, show that puberty offers an opportune 
window for recovering height growth losses experienced in early childhood (see Coly et al. 2006; Prentice et al. 
2013; and Hirvonen 2014). Therefore, for the purpose of this review, we estimated the same regression model 
as Baez (2011) by reconstructing part of the main regression table in Baez using the recent 2010 round of the 
Kagera Health and Development Survey. Table 3.1 presents the results of this analysis and shows that the 
height gap between children originating from areas characterized by high and low density of refugee inflows is 
no longer statistically significant. This finding suggests that the children whose growth, as measured by height, 
was hindered due to the arrival of refugees were able to catch up with the control group during puberty. 
The foregoing section demonstrates that more research is needed to better understand the long-term 
health consequences of hosting refugees. In particular, there is no longitudinal quantitative evidence on the 
implications for youth and adult health outcomes and the impact on household food security. Finally, the 
qualitative studies highlight the importance of context, especially on the capacity of the hosting government to 
handle the sudden refugee shock to its healthcare system, as well as the extent to which refugee-focused 
external health assistance can affect health outcomes of the local populations. 
 
 
3 Baez (2011) related the refugee crisis in Kagera to a “natural experiment” that was sudden, with a sharp variation in its 
impact across the region. The geographic variation as well as the access to data before and after the crisis allowed the 
author to construct control and treatment groups akin to a setting in a more conventional randomized controlled trial. As a 
consequence, a causal interpretation could be given to the estimates.  
4 Height is a particularly useful measure here because, unlike weight, it captures the long-term effects of poor health and 
undernutrition (Ruel and Hoddinott 2008). Furthermore, our results are robust to using height-for-age z-scores, but in 
Table 3.1 we opt for reporting the regressions based on raw measures of height to facilitate a direct comparison with the 
results presented by Baez (2011). 
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Table 3.1 Long-run impacts of refugee hosting on height in the Kagera region, 1991–2010 
Outcome 
Treatment variable: West = 1, East = 0 Distance to the Rwandan border 
Preshock mean Pooled Panel Pooled Panel 
  West = 1 East = 0 (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) (1) (2) 
As reported by Baez using the 2004 data: 
Height (cm) 84.90 86.31 –1.943 –1.719** –1.777* –2.184* 0.028 0.020** 0.028** 0.029** 
 (1.030) (0.639) (2.068) (0.680) (0.914) (1.189) (0.023) (0.009) (0.011) (0.012) 
Observations   1,861 1,785 1,159 1,078 1,861 1,785 1,159 1,078 
           
Estimates using the 2010 data: 
Height (cm) 84.90 86.37 0.254 0.341 –1.459 –1.002 –0.008 0.004 0.003 0.014 
 (1.662) (0.631) (1.939)  (1.391)  (1.973) (1.406)  (0.023) (0.016)  (0.023)  (0.016)  
Observations   1,199 1,151 1,084 1,038 1,199 1,151 1,084 1,038 
Controls?   No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Source: Kagera Health and Development Survey 1991–2010 (Beegle, De Weerdt, and Dercon 2006; De Weerdt et al. 2012) and Baez (2011). 
Notes: * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the village-year level. The unit of observation is a child who 
was under five in 1994 and 10–15 years old in 2004 or 16–21 years old in 2010. The difference-in-difference regressions include controls for individual characteristics (age and sex), 
household characteristics, parental education, household assets and expenditures, rainfall variability, distance to closest health facility, and time-invariant village fixed effects. The sample 
size in the pooled regressions is smaller due to the high outmigration rate at this age (16–21). The survey team did track and interview most of these migrants, and including them in the 
sample provides broadly similar results. 
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3.2 SECURITY AND CONFLICT 
Perceptions of the impact of refugees on the hosting community through the security and conflict mechanism 
start from the belief that refugees pose security problems in hosting countries (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; 
Ruegger and Bohnet 2011; Bohnet 2012). Salehyan and Gleditsch (2006) argued that the presence of refugees 
enhances the likelihood of a host country’s experiencing political instability and conflict. Refugee camps may 
encourage the expansion of rebel social networks across borders by feeding grievances among refugees and 
allowing for an exchange of resources (weapons, combatants, and ideas). Refugee camps can also be used for 
mobilization and logistical coordination to perpetuate violence in the countries of origin or to provide 
motivation and resources for domestic political opposition in the host country. Examples portraying this 
situation are the conflict prior to 1992 between the Palestine Liberation Organization and both Jordan and 
Lebanon (Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006), the emergence of the Taliban in Afghanistan from Afghan refugees in 
Pakistan (Keen 2008), and eastern DRC and Darfur (de Waal 1997; Milner and Loescher 2004; Prunier 2008).5 
Policymakers have linked insecurity and conflict with refugee inflows and therefore tend to believe that 
refugees affect food security in host communities through the conflict channel (Jacobsen 2000; Rutinwa and 
Kamanga 2003). Indeed, experiences of the protracted refugee situations have raised much concern over the 
security implications of refugees on host countries, even though empirical evidence is largely missing (except 
for Salehyan and Gleditsch 2006; and Fearon and Laitin 2011).  
From a methodological point of view, it is often very difficult to separate conflict spillovers associated with 
refugees’ presence from conflict arising from economic and political motives (greed and grievances) and ethnic 
differences (Stavenhagen 1996; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Collier and Hoeffler 2004) as well as operational 
factors such as access to arms, illicit trade and finances, and geographic factors (Ballentine and Sherman 2003; 
Buhaug, Gates, and Lujala 2009). Establishing causality is a major challenge for this literature because the 
impact of refugees cannot be isolated from other negative conflict spillovers arising from, for example, trade 
channels or disease propagation. Moreover, much of the literature assesses the effects of refugee inflows from 
the onset of conflict, defined at the national level. Given the lack of evidence showing that refugee inflow is 
the actual cause of conflict spillover, it is difficult to conceive of refugees as posing a direct threat to security at 
the national level. This raises the question of whether there are a number of alternative channels through 
which refugees affect security in host countries.  
First, food production activities may be disrupted as farmers flee or limit their farming activities due to 
security concerns and conflict. This disruption can lead to lower food production and availability locally, but in 
protracted refugee contexts it may imply long-term disruption of food production. Alix-Garcia and Bartlett 
(2012) and Alix-Garcia, Bartlett, and Saah (2013) examined spatial changes in agricultural production in the 
presence of civil war in Sudan and showed that farmers abandon their land due to insecurity, which leads to 
lower production and welfare losses to rural landowners. Due to lower production, farmers earn less income 
from the sale of farm output surplus, implying that they have less cash to purchase food from the market.  
Trade in food products may also be interrupted by crime and conflict if refugee inflows result in security 
threats along trading routes or border posts. However, trade often continues, and the mere prevalence of 
insecurity and conflict causes food prices to spike because transaction costs increase, which leads to even 
higher food prices. Traders might charge risk premiums to protect themselves and their goods against security 
costs (Goldsmith 2013). Fighting groups might also impose extortion/taxation, forcing some traders to 
5 In his insightful book, Prunier (2008) showed that refugees from a similar country may have very different security 
implications across borders. Beginning in April 1994, approximately 1.5 million Rwandese refugees hosted in eastern DRC 
differed significantly from their counterparts fleeing to western Tanzania. Practically all politicians and military men, also 
called the génocidaires, went to the DRC (former Zaire), where President Mobutu favored the fallen regime (Prunier 2008). 
The dynamics of mobilization and militarization enforced in the eastern Congolese camps through, for example, the control 
of food supply and the purchase of weapons were some of the roots of the subsequent conflict in DRC in 1997, known as 
the first Congolese war (Prunier 2008). 
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withdraw from the market and inducing a separate increase effect on food prices as the total quantities of 
traded food decrease.6 Finally, insecurity and conflict in host communities and along routes may prevent the 
flow and operations of food and emergency aid, resulting in unabated food insecurity (Majid and McDowell 
2012; Menkhaus 2012). In some instances the situation can worsen if conflict involves the destruction of road 
infrastructure and looting from market centers and food storage facilities, implying that traders may need to 
find alternative routes and markets to reach consumers in host communities. However, it is difficult to 
separate the multiple price effects that lead to the overall increase in food prices. Moreover, these effects are 
likely to occur in contexts beset with conflict and insecurity (regardless of the presence of refugee inflows), 
and conflict and crime are often not perpetrated by refugees but by militia and rebel groups, which led to the 
refugee situation in the first place (Jacobsen 2000). 
Real or perceived, negative externalities from the presence of refugees may also indirectly spur conflict in 
host countries. An increase in competition for scarce resources, housing, and employment and a decline in the 
standard of living have been argued to create favorable conditions for civil strife (Martin 2005; Salehyan and 
Gleditsch 2006). In contrast, refugee inflows may trigger an increase in the flow of (government and donor) 
resources into the refugee-hosting areas (see below) (Czaika and Mayer 2011). Fisk (2012) established a 
statistical association between the presence of refugee camps and the level of violence against civilians but 
proposed a different mechanism. Given the resources injected into the hosting economies (see below) by 
humanitarian assistance, this increase in violence against civilians (so-called one-sided violence) is explained by 
a surge in incentives for armed groups to extract resources from civilians (local hosts and/or refugees) through 
violent means. This explanation is consistent with other evidence stressing the vulnerability of refugees to 
violence (Keen 1998; Jacobsen 1999). 
Security concerns have consistently frustrated efforts to resolve refugee situations and hindered the 
formulation of effective regional development strategies (Milner and Loescher 2004). They therefore need to 
be considered when dealing with food insecurity in protracted refugee situations. Most governments respond 
to security concerns in refugee camps by closing borders and restricting refugee movements to make it easier 
for the military and police forces to control the security problem. However, these measures may further 
constrain the limited trade that often persists in refugee settings, potentially hampering the import supply of 
food into local markets and worsening food insecurity in the host community (Hendrix and Brinkman 2013). 
There appears to be limited evidence to suggest that these policy approaches necessarily lower the risk of 
insecurity and conflict, or of how they affect the food security of the host community. Moreover, the effects of 
such responses may exacerbate the likelihood of conflict and insecurity by fueling resentment and strife 
among refugees and related ethnic groups in the host community (Jacobsen 2000). Generally the mechanisms 
through which the multiple channels at play operate are not well understood, and there is a need to conduct 
rigorous research, irrespective of whether conflict is caused by refugee inflows or otherwise. Understanding 
these links between refugees, security, conflict, and food security can provide useful insights for alternative 
policies in refugee settings. 
3.3 ENVIRONMENTAL DEGRADATION AND RESOURCE COMPETITION 
Large-scale refugee influxes are likely to increase population pressure on the often already fragile environment 
and accelerate natural-resource depletion in host areas (Jacobsen 1997; Martin 2005; Berry 2008). The 
environmental impacts of refugees indirectly affect the food security of the host community through 
deforestation, soil erosion and land degradation, unsustainable water extraction, and water pollution, which 
have both short-run and long-run effects (Whitaker 2002; Martin 2005). The presence of refugees in Tanzania 
6 Aklilu and Catley (2009) documented the example of livestock trade among the pastoralists in the Horn of Africa, where 
trade in cattle has continued for years despite conflict and a protracted refugee situation in surrounding areas. In this case, 
the livestock traders incur costs associated with the security challenges of protecting themselves and their livestock, which 
they sell in exchange for cash and food products. 
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accelerated deforestation rates and depletion of soil nutrient availability for agricultural crops, causing 
additional soil erosion and thereby affecting the host’s agricultural production and food security (Berry 2008).7 
Moreover, increased firewood depletion forces women to spend more time collecting firewood, negatively 
affecting child nutrition and women’s ability to care for their children (UNEP 2005). Similarly, excessive water 
extraction arising from refugee inflows reduces the amount of water available per capita in the host 
community and increases competition. Women are forced to spend more time in obtaining water, and 
downstream communities have less water available for irrigation (Johnson and Libecap 1982). 
The environmental impact channels of refugees’ effects on the food security of host communities are 
certainly plausible, but rigorous research on these impact channels in refugee settings is still lacking. 
Moreover, establishing causality in these relationships is difficult because environmental scarcity is argued to 
act as an indirect cause of conflict, and settlement patterns also influence the environmental impacts of 
refugees (Jacobsen 1997). Negative (exogenous) environmental impacts are thought to engender competition 
for resources, which may then cause conflict and refugee situations as people flee conflict, but this impact 
pathway has been contested in the literature (Gleditsch 1998; Homer-Dixon 1999; Schwartz, Deligiannis, and 
Homer-Dixon 2000). Hence, there might be misconceptions about the negative impacts of refugees on the 
environment because it is difficult or even impossible to determine the exact environmental impacts of 
refugees, given the lack of an adequate counterfactual (Kibreab 1997; UNEP 2005). 
The main livelihood/occupation of the refugees relative to that of the locals appears to determine the 
extent of resource competition and natural resource depletion that occurs in refugee situations. Hence some 
have advocated for providing refugees with alternative livelihood opportunities that are different from the 
main livelihoods that the local poor depend on. More importantly, the livelihood opportunities proposed are 
alternatives to those that involve the deforestation and charcoal trading that is common in many refugee 
situations in Africa. Cooperative resource management solutions are believed to mitigate the impacts of 
refugees on the environment, thereby attenuating the risks of resource-related conflicts (Martin 2005) and 
improving successful integration (World Bank 2011). In that respect, the environmental support programs 
limiting the collection of firewood by refugees around the Dadaab camp in Kenya or providing alternative fuel 
sources have shown relative success in limiting environmental degradation and likely mitigating impacts on the 
host communities’ food security (Milner and Loescher 2004). 
So far, we have assessed the direct and indirect effects of refugees on the food-security system of the 
hosting community by looking at the mechanisms that are often proposed as general (negative) consequences 
of hosting refugees. However, refugees also directly affect the different determinants of food security—food 
availability, access, and utilization (Figure 3.1)—which are covered in the following sections. 
3.4 LOCAL PRODUCTION, TRANSPORTATION, AND TRADE: MAIN DETERMINANTS OF FOOD 
AVAILABILITY 
Food availability is not only determined by local production but also by the ability of households to benefit 
from food imports from neighboring regions or countries.8 As Pieters, Guariso, and Vandeplas (2013) pointed 
out, the supply of food is largely contingent on the road and market infrastructure, the degree of market 
7 Refugees used 65 percent more wood than the local average Tanzanian because most firewood would be sold as charcoal 
or used for building materials. 
8 Food importing is usually done by traders (wholesale and retail) and sometimes by governments, but usually not 
individually by households. Also, in situations of large refugee inflows, aid agencies often import food as part of their 
refugee assistance programs. One cannot exclude the possibility that refugees are themselves producing some food. 
Indeed, a small plot of land is usually allocated to refugees within refugee camps. Theoretically, such within-camp 
production has the potential to increase food supply, but it is likely to remain limited in magnitude (see footnote 11). 
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integration, and local market conditions. The existing literature suggests that the host communities may 
actually benefit from the presence of refugees. 
First of all, the large-scale arrival of refugees provides increased trade opportunities to the local 
community. The significant increase in local market size provides greater market access and opportunities for 
farmers to liquidate their surplus (Whitaker 2002). For example, prior to the arrival of refugees, farmers in 
western Tanzania often had to rely on cross-border trading with neighboring Burundi and Rwanda because of 
difficulties in finding local markets (Ndege et al. 1995; Whitaker 2002). As a result of the refugee presence, the 
markets moved closer to the local Tanzanian farmers, who then benefited from better access to trade 
opportunities. Furthermore, the land availability in the northwestern part of Tanzania facilitated the expansion 
of agricultural production. Finally, the nonfarm sector also benefited from the increased demand from national 
and international humanitarian workers, although at the cost of driving the existing petty businesses out of the 
market due to fiercer competition (Alix-Garcia, Bartlett, and Saah 2012; Maystadt and Verwimp, 
forthcoming).9 In Kenya, pastoralists have also taken the opportunity to sell livestock products to the refugee 
camps, a trade that is estimated to yield US$3 million to the host country every year (NORDECO 2010). Every 
year, an average of 15 camels and 30 shoats (that is, sheep and goats) are slaughtered within the Dadaab 
refugee camps, of which the majority are sold by local hosts. Moreover, trade and employment opportunities 
have also emerged around the Dadaab camps in Kenya. Wholesalers inside refugee camps are reported to 
import commodities from Somalia with high unit value, such as sugar, powdered milk, pasta, fruit drinks, and 
upmarket consumer goods. 
A second benefit is the improvement in market efficiency and trade dynamism because of road 
investments made by international organizations (Jacobsen 2002), given the strong link between road 
accessibility and economic development (see, for example, Fan, Hazell, and Thorat 2000; Jacoby and Minten 
2009; and Dorosh et al. 2012). Recent evidence by Maystadt and Duranton (2013) also suggests that refugee-
hosting areas may still benefit from the refugee presence several years after the refugees have been 
repatriated, thanks to the long-term benefits of improved road accessibility. In other contexts, refugee influxes 
are associated with increased pressure on infrastructure and public services in host countries, requiring 
additional public spending from often already financially strapped governments. On the whole, the impact on 
food availability will depend in the short run on the ability of producers, notably in terms of input (land, labor, 
and capital) to react to an upward shift in demand, while investments in roads initially made to serve refugee 
camps seem to be crucial to determine the long-term impact of refugees in host communities. 
3.5 FOOD AND NONFOOD PRICES: DRIVER OF FOOD ACCESSIBILITY 
Food accessibility is largely determined by food prices and household resources. Hence, the massive arrival of 
refugees is likely to change prices in the hosting areas. However, the impact of the presence of refugees and 
humanitarian workers is expected to be product and time dependent and to have a dual effect. Increased 
demand exerts an immediate upward pressure on nonaid prices (food and nonfood) in hosting areas, 
incidentally leading to a general increase in the cost of living, while food aid partially offsets this price impact 
(Werker 2007).10 In contrast, both food aid and the incentives to produce more of the preferred goods will 
have a second-order decreasing effect on prices.11 The equilibrium prices resulting from both demand and 
9 The new attractiveness of refugee-hosting areas seems to be accompanied by fiercer competition following the entry of 
larger-scale and more efficient entrepreneurs coming from other regions, like Mwanza, Shinyanga, or Kilimanjaro 
(Maystadt and Verwimp, forthcoming). 
10 The impact of food aid on local market prices is of course not specific to the refugee-hosting economy, although the 
evidence in other contexts is more mixed (see Margolies and Hoddinott 2012 for a review).  
11 A decrease in price may potentially result from within-camp production, but the price effect is likely to be marginal. At 
least in the case of Tanzania, refugee density makes the land allocation too small to have any potentially large effect on 
total food supply and prices. 
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supply changes will vary across products and over time as factor allocations may take time to adjust to prices. 
Hence, the net effect on prices will depend on the main food aid delivered, the local preferences, the reaction 
of local producers, and the ability to import substitutes. While markets are likely to correct the initial increase 
in food prices over time, the distributional consequences of such price effects may persist. 
In the case of Tanzania, Alix-Garcia and Saah (2010) found large price effects on some agricultural 
products, mainly nonaid food goods (for example, plantains, legumes, milk, and beans) and nonfood goods (for 
example, housing). The authors regressed food prices of various markets on the distance to refugee camps and 
the related food aid. Table 3.2 indicates that by 1998 the inflows of Burundian refugees and the associated 
increase in demand had strongly increased the prices of maize, maize flour, legumes, and plantains.12 
However, the increased supply of maize through the food aid delivered by the World Food Programme (WFP) 
mitigated the increase in price, causing the net effect for maize to be close to zero. Interestingly, the higher 
nonaid prices could potentially induce producers to expand production (especially for bananas). Due to data 
unavailability, the long-term consequences of such general equilibrium effects are unknown. An exception is 
the study by Maystadt and Duranton (2013), who suggested that the inflow of refugees and associated long-
term consequences of reduced transportation costs decreased general price levels by 2010 (including food 
prices), but a reduction in demand following resettlement was an obvious source of a price correction. 
In another context, Figure 3.2 records similar price dynamics that Alix-Garcia, Bartlett, and Saah (2012) 
found in Darfur (Sudan). Although the authors were cautious in giving causal interpretation to price trends, 
they did observe strong correlations between the inflows of IDPs in 2004 and changes in food prices. For the 
preferred food items (sorghum and millet), average yearly prices strongly increased but were potentially 
compensated afterwards by the effect of food aid. However, the exogenous increase in supply of the bulk 
product of food aid (wheat) was not compensated by any significant increase in demand because it is not the 
preferred grain in Darfur. Such analysis underlines the importance of taking into account local preferences 
when predicting price effects in the short and long run. Alix-Garcia, Bartlett, and Saah (2012) also reported a 
large increase in the rental markets and urban sprawl along the main city (Nyala) close to IDP camps, having 
clear distributional consequences depending on the initial housing ownership. Finally, more anecdotal 
evidence from Kenya suggests similar price reactions. According to NORDECO (2010), the price of basic 
commodities such as maize, rice, wheat, sugar, and cooking oil was at least 20 percent lower in refugee camps 
than in towns without the camps in arid and semiarid parts of Kenya due to food aid and illegal imports from 
Somalia. In summary, the case studies from Tanzania, Kenya, and Uganda point to the importance of price 
reactions to the inflows of refugees. However, the general equilibrium and long-term effects would again 
depend on the extent of food aid inflows and the ability of households to adjust their production and 
consumption decisions to changes in prices. 
12 The results are directly taken from Alix-Garcia and Saah (2010). The authors argued that a causal interpretation could be 
given to the results because “the location of the camps is random in a larger sense: the refugees entered Tanzania, rather 
than other border countries, as a result of directional pushes of internal conflict within their own countries, which is 
unlikely to have been affected by markets in Tanzania” (Alix-Garcia and Saah 2010, 12). They also suggested that the threat 
of reverse causality for food aid is minimal because, based on conversations with World Food Programme representatives, 
“the magnitude of aid shipments is determined by the population censuses conducted in the refugee camps rather than by 
local prices” (Alix-Garcia and Saah 2010, 12). 
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Table 3.2 Impact of refugee camps and aid on agricultural prices in Tanzania, 1992–1998 
  Maize Maize flour Legumes Plantains 
Share of Burundian refugees  0.088* 0.128** 0.150*** 0.398* 
 (0.053) (0.057) (0.034) (0.299) 
Share of Rwandan refugees  –0.038 –0.050 0.081*** 0.625*** 
 (0.065) (0.045) (0.028) (0.182) 
Total aid 0.040*** 0.015 –0.009 –0.037 
 (0.005) (0.011) (0.007) (0.023) 
Maize aid –0.032*** –0.013   
 (0.007) (0.012)   
Legume aid   –0.078**  
     (0.035)   
Observations 2,335 2,183 2,417 1,849 
R-squared 0.64 0.68 0.84 0.49 
Source: Alix-Garcia and Saah (2010). 
Notes: * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the natural log of the food price. All 
variables are interacted with the inverse of the distance between the observed market and the closest refugee camp. 
Results from ordinary least squares regressions, including weather controls, market fixed effects, and year/month fixed 
effects.  
 
Figure 3.2 Trends in food prices in refugee-hosting Nyala (Darfur, Sudan), 2000–2008 
 
Source: Alix-Garcia, Bartlett, and Saah (2012), using price data provided by the local Food and Agriculture Organization 
office in Nyala (Darfur) and data on aid delivered to the entire country by the World Food Programme.  
Notes: MT = million metric tons. The observed changes in both prices and aid are attributed to the arrival of internally 
displaced persons in Nyala in late 2004.  
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3.6 LABOR: DRIVER OF FOOD AVAILABILITY AND ACCESSIBILITY 
The presence of refugees usually has a profound impact on labor market outcomes in hosting areas, which is a 
key driver of food security. Together with food prices, household resources constitute the major determinant 
of food accessibility, but in turn, the use of labor will largely determine farming households’ ability to increase 
production (see Section 3.4). Refugees generally constitute a large supply of mainly low-skilled labor, creating 
opportunities that benefit both local farmers and entrepreneurs. Qualitative evidence from Tanzania suggests 
that the abundance of refugee labor enabled farmers to expand and increase production (Whitaker 2002). The 
evidence from the Karagwe district of Tanzania suggests that, on average, farmers doubled their production of 
bananas and beans between 1993 and 1996 (Whitaker 2002). Similarly in Guinea, Liberian refugees gave a 
boost to rice production by facilitating an expansion of cultivation to the lower swamp areas (Van Damme 
1995).  
The larger pool of low-skilled labor from the refugee population is, however, likely to come at a cost to the 
local low-skilled workers, and especially so for the poor and landless. Based on more than 2,700 households 
followed over time between 1991 and 2004, Maystadt and Verwimp (forthcoming) show that the agricultural 
workers in the region of Kagera in Tanzania were the most vulnerable to increased labor market competition 
from the refugee influx, while self-employed farmers were more likely to benefit. Table 3.3 reports that real 
consumption per adult equivalent increased by about 8 percent following the doubling of refugees in Kagera, 
but benefits were lower for those initially working as agricultural workers or self-employed in nonagricultural 
activities.13 Kreibaum (2013) indicated that economic gains were distributed differently among the host 
communities in Uganda, with benefits specifically concentrated among those owning businesses or properties, 
compared with those depending on wage income. Comparing urban households in Darfur that have seen huge 
inflows of IDPs in their neighborhoods with similar households in Kordofan with no IDPs, Alix-Garcia and 
Bartlett (2012) found a significant difference in the changes in occupations between 2000 and 2010. They 
observed an abandonment of agricultural activities near the city in Darfur in favor of entry into the service 
sector (the skilled sector in particular for women). 
In Kenya, the impact assessment led by NORDECO (2010) did not point to such a substitution effect 
between refugees and unskilled workers, because the local wages appeared to be significantly higher in 
Dadaab than in other comparable parts of Kenya. This situation can be linked to the importance of pastoralism, 
serving as a complementary activity to diversify the sources of livelihood.14 The apparent lack of labor 
substitutability may also explain why not only well-off households made use of the economic opportunities 
associated with the refugee camps in Kenya. Around the Dadaab refugee complex, the low-middle-income 
group and the poor are primarily engaged in selling their products to refugee camps (NORDECO 2010). The 
locals may also benefit from increased employment opportunities in the international relief organizations 
(Whitaker 2002; Landau 2004). For example, about 600–700 local people are reported to have fixed 
employment in the humanitarian sector, while an additional 500 jobs are found in the refugee-related trade 
sector. 
13 Maystadt and Verwimp (forthcoming) suggest that these results can be causally interpreted as lower-bound estimates 
because (1) there was little maneuvering room to move large and unanticipated flows of refugees very far away from the 
border, (2) refugee camps were systematically located in the worst places (in terms of initial real consumption per adult 
equivalent), (3) the results could not be explained by a trend existing before the refugees arrived, and (4) native 
displacements and attrition rates were actually lower in refugee-hosting areas compared with other areas. 
14 NORDECO (2010) reported a decrease in average livestock holdings per household in the area surrounding the Dadaab 
camp due to increased population and limited grazing resources. However, a similar trend has been documented in many 
other arid and semiarid lowland parts of eastern Africa (Headey and Kennedy 2012), making it difficult to attribute these 
Dadaab findings to the refugee situation. 
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Table 3.3 Impact of refugees on consumption in Tanzania, 1991–2004 
  
Real consumption  
per adult equivalent 
Refugee index (RI) 0.083** 0.062* 
  (0.034) (0.034) 
Agricultural self-employed * RI  0.008** 
  (0.004) 
Nonagricultural labor * RI   –0.007 
  (0.006) 
Agricultural labor * RI   –0.009* 
  (0.005) 
Nonagricultural self-employed * RI   –0.018*** 
  (0.004) 
Observations 4,220 4,220 
 
R-squared 0.31  0.32 
Source: Maystadt and Verwimp (forthcoming). 
Notes: * significant at the 10 percent level; ** significant at the 5 percent level; *** significant at the 1 percent level. 
Numbers in parentheses are robust standard errors. The dependent variable is the natural logarithm of real consumption 
per adult equivalent. Results are from ordinary least squares regressions, including weather controls, time-varying 
household characteristics, household and village fixed effects, and year fixed effects. The refugee index is computed by 
village as the sum of the refugee population across 13 refugee camps, weighted by the distance between the concerned 
village and each refugee camp.  
However, not all is positive because many skilled workers from the public sector may leave their positions 
to work for relief agencies due to inflated salaries offered by these organizations (Whitaker 2002). In Tanzania, 
the employment opportunities generated by national and international organizations around refugee camps 
are reported to have attracted a large number of (relatively skilled) migrants from other regions of Tanzania 
(Landau 2004). This migration may result in long-term benefits for the hosting economies (through the 
accumulation of human capital and agglomeration economies—see Maystadt and Duranton 2013), but it 
comes at a cost to the neighboring regions. Büscher and Vlassenroot (2010) provided qualitative evidence of 
this employment boost in the context of the eastern part of the DRC.15 The authors illustrated how the 
humanitarian presence has transformed the city of Goma in North Kivu by providing labor opportunities not 
only in the humanitarian sector but also in the service sector (for example, tourism, restaurants, shops, hotels, 
private security).  
The review of the literature clearly points to the importance of the labor markets for determining food 
availability when refugees can be used to expand local production and food accessibility by their indirect 
effects on household resources. It appears rather clear that the distributional effects through the labor 
markets will be affected by the degree of substitutability between refugees and the different segments of the 
local host population. 
  
15 The authors pointed to the artificial nature of this development, the associated transfer of power and legitimacy from 
the state to international actors, and the renewed local conflict dynamics. 
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4. ADAPTATION MECHANISMS AND POLICY OPTIONS: TRANSITIONING TO 
DEVELOPMENT 
The economic and food-security impacts of large-scale influxes of refugees on host communities are both 
important and complex. The previous section discussed the emerging body of literature on quantifying these 
impacts on host communities (Alix-Garcia and Bartlett 2012; Alix-Garcia, Bartlett, and Saah 2012, 2013; Alix-
Garcia and Saah 2010; Maystadt and Verwimp, forthcoming; Maystadt and Duranton 2013; NORDECO 2010; 
Kreibaum 2013). So far the results are very context specific, but three main stylized facts that relate to food 
security in host communities can be derived. These stylized facts allow us, then, to frame some important 
research questions in terms of resilience-enhancing policies in host communities.  
First, the current focus on health and violence in refugee situations is clearly too limited. The literature 
review and conceptual framework point to the multiple direct and indirect impact pathways that need to be 
considered. For instance, the role of labor and goods markets as adaptation mechanisms is critical in refugee 
settings, because these markets can provide vehicles for positive impacts on food security as well as negative 
impacts for some subgroups of the host community. The positive impacts of these market-based mechanisms 
depend on the ability of local producers to respond to increased demand (in particular for food), the ability of 
traders to engage in trade (of both food and nonfood not produced locally), and the potential for learning and 
transfer of technical skills between refugee and host-community labor. These factors depend on preexisting 
conditions such as infrastructure, labor skill levels, land availability, and agricultural potential, but likely also on 
refugee policy (for example, refugee work regulation, refugees’ access to land, restrictions on trade and 
refugee mobility, and so on). Therefore, it is imperative to evaluate a broad spectrum of policies and 
investments that have the potential to strengthen the ability of host households and refugees to adapt to the 
dynamics of refugee settings through goods and labor market mechanisms, even if such policies and 
investments may take time to implement.16 Environmental degradation should also be taken seriously as one 
potential pathway of refugees’ impact on food security in the host community, in both the short and the long 
run. Food security of the host community is affected by the quality of the environment and may be protected 
by enhancing environmental resilience through various policies and programs, such as the careful selection of 
refugee camp locations and settlement structure (based on environmental research evidence) as well as 
implementation of environmental programs in host communities designed to mitigate negative environmental 
impacts of refugees (for example, reforestation and soil conservation interventions). The long-term nature of 
these adaptation mechanisms and policies highlights the need for longitudinal studies in refugee settings. 
Second, as Chambers (1986) seminally argued, the inflows of refugees are likely to have profound 
consequences on the distribution of socioeconomic outcomes among the host population. Overall the impacts 
on local households depend on a number of factors (such as age, gender, class and occupation, and so on), but 
these factors are also likely to determine the distribution of (positive and negative) impacts among the host 
population. For instance, the immediate effects of a food price increase are twofold. As net consumers of food 
absorb a negative income effect from higher prices, farmers who would have produced a surplus benefit from 
an increased demand for agricultural products in local markets. In the particular case of Tanzania and Uganda, 
the overall net impact has been viewed as positive and persistent over time (Maystadt and Verwimp, 
forthcoming; Kreibaum 2013; Maystadt and Duranton 2013) but with major distributional consequences that 
require careful consideration in relation to refugee policy. Alix-Garcia and Bartlett (2012) also highlighted 
similar distributional impacts in the case of IDP flows in Darfur but, contrary to Maystadt and Verwimp 
(forthcoming), they found evidence of a negative, but short-lived, overall impact. The different context (rural 
16 For instance, it may take several years to complete a public program that builds or rehabilitates roads in a host 
community, especially if there are security challenges. However, given the protracted duration of most refugee situations 
and the long-term positive impacts associated with infrastructure investments, public works programs may be beneficial 
and potentially facilitate the transition to development in host communities in the long run. 
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versus urban settings) and the importance of land availability to increase agricultural production and 
productivity (Maystadt 2011) may constitute a major explanation for the different study results.17 Assessing 
the more general validity of these case studies remains a major knowledge gap for future research. 
All in all, it may be useful to differentiate between distributional impacts in terms of economic and social 
impacts of refugee inflows on host communities. The evidence seems to suggest that poorer households in the 
host community are likely to benefit from increased public goods (such as health infrastructure) and services, 
yet they may fare less favorably in terms of market-based economic opportunities that arise from the inflow of 
refugees. Those households who initially have access to some physical (for example, land, housing, livestock), 
human (education), and social (community ties and leadership) capital are in a better position to reap most of 
the economic benefits while minimizing the costs associated with an influx of refugees in their community. The 
likely result is that better-off households enter more rewarding economic activities (for example, new 
businesses or work in the humanitarian sector) or profitably expand existing activities (for example, 
agricultural production), while the worse off are possibly trapped in poverty (for example, landless agricultural 
laborers competing with cheap refugee labor). For this reason, to better inform policy, it is also important to 
consider the potentially ameliorating impacts of safety-net policies targeted at the poor of the host 
community, and to perform impact evaluations of alternative safety-net interventions in host communities. 
Third, there is a need to recognize the interdependencies between refugees and their hosts, including the 
period for some years after the refugees have left the host areas. Households and local communities may need 
some time to adjust to population shocks associated with refugees (both the sudden influx at the beginning 
and the gradual or sudden departure of refugees to their countries of origin). In the short run, environmental 
degradation and disease propagation are certainly risks that need to be controlled for to support adaptation 
mechanisms by the host population. The risk of violence and crime cannot be understated. However, in the 
long run, humanitarian assistance should pave the way for development efforts. In particular, the 
development efforts may have an opportunity to capitalize on investments such as improved road 
infrastructure and social networks formed during the refugee situation, for example, by fostering trade that 
takes place via the improved roads or is based on the social networks formed between the repatriated 
refugees and host communities.  
In terms of policy, an obvious if not simplistic approach to enhancing food security and resilience in the 
host community is to promote conflict resolution, strengthen governance institutions in the country of origin, 
and accelerate the transition from humanitarian aid to economic recovery and growth (Collier and Rohner 
2008). The underlying assumption that the food security of the host community will improve once refugees 
return to their countries of origin has not been tested empirically, but this seems to be a premise of most 
refugee-development policies. Many long-term solutions (including repatriation and resettlement as proposed 
by the UNHCR) appear to hinge on the assumption that removing the protracted refugee population from the 
host community will improve outcomes for all. This assumption does not consider how these policies or 
solutions may affect the food security of both the host community and the refugees in the long run (after the 
refugees have left). Anecdotal evidence from the refugee-hosting areas of Malawi, Tanzania, and West Africa 
suggests that some combinations of conflict resolution, economic recovery, and gradual strengthening of 
governance institutions in the refugee-sending countries—Mozambique, Rwanda, and Liberia, respectively—
helped to reduce refugee inflows and ultimately engendered voluntary repatriation of refugees. However, 
while food security in some of these host communities improved, it is not clear whether the improvement was 
a direct result of the refugees’ returning to their countries of origin (Zetter 1995; Crisp 2010; World Bank 
17 A qualitative assessment in Kenya also pointed to a net positive impact on the hosting population (NORDECO 2010). As a 
result of labor income, incomes to local contractors, and trading activities with refugees, the annual benefits to the local 
population were roughly estimated to be about US$14.2 million, which translates into US$95 in annual per capita benefits. 
The difference from the Sudanese case may be due to pastoralism, a livelihood activity that is different from those found 
among refugees outside of the camps. 
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2011). Irrespectively, while conflict resolution is desirable, the process of resolving conflict and promoting 
economic recovery often takes a long time, and there is a paucity of research on how best to accelerate it 
(Crisp 2010). Since the timing and nature (sequence and magnitude) of conflict resolution interventions can 
affect the duration of conflict, it could affect the impact on food security in host communities. The limited 
evidence available only suggests that addressing conflict through mediation soon after disputes erupt and 
through incorporation of local governance structures often shortens the duration of conflict and is likely to 
limit refugee inflows into host communities (Regan and Stam 2000; Regan 2002).  
Traditionally, though, the international community, under the leadership of the UNHCR, has usually relied 
on three main solutions to protracted refugee situations: voluntary repatriation, local integration, and 
resettlement.18 These programs assume that integrated interventions in host communities are effective at 
addressing the challenges of protracted refugee situations and their related food-security impacts. However, 
there is no formal evaluation of the long-term impacts of these approaches on the food security of host 
communities. Moreover, these three policy options involve unique challenges and none of them is a one-size-
fits-all solution.  
In the short run, one set of policy instruments that has been used widely in refugee settings is 
humanitarian aid. The myriad types and modalities of humanitarian aid have wide-ranging impacts on food 
security in host communities. The timing, source, and type of aid as well as where and to whom it is targeted 
have significant implications for the food security and resilience of the host community (Barrett and Maxwell 
2005; Tschirley and del Castillo 2007; Lentz et al. 2013). Of all the different types of humanitarian aid, food aid 
is probably linked most closely to food security and has received much debate and analysis in the literature. In 
general, food aid improves food availability and can mitigate sharp increases in prices of aid-related food items 
in the short run (del Ninno, Dorosh, and Subbarao 2007; Kirwan and McMillan 2007). However, depending on 
whether it is directed only to refugee camps or to nearby households in the host community as well, it will 
have varying distributional impacts. Often the poorer households of the host population are disfavored if the 
supply is not sufficient to prevent local food price hikes, and in these circumstances the aid likely erodes their 
capacity to build resilience and long-term food security (Chambers 1986).  
In the majority of cases, food aid is delivered (or targeted) to refugee camps and excludes the poor in the 
host communities. Usually the refugees will trade some of the food aid they receive with the host communities 
to obtain cash for purchasing other goods and services, and this trade often involves wealthier groups in the 
host communities, a practice that also has distributional implications for food security in the host community. 
This mechanism has led some to believe that it may be more efficient and equitable to provide cash transfers 
or vouchers (conditional or unconditional) to both refugees and poor households in the host communities, 
especially if food and other goods can be purchased at affordable prices from the local markets (Jaspars et al. 
2007; Bailey, Savage, and O’Callaghan 2008; UNRWA 2011; GHA 2012; UNHCR 2012a). In addition to reduced 
transportation, storage, and distribution costs, the main advantage of cash-based interventions is to empower 
the beneficiaries to make efficient decisions on consumption and to increase protection inasmuch as cash is 
less visible and less subject to theft than food. A major risk is the fact that cash-based interventions may have 
a stronger impact on nonbeneficiaries when food markets are not well integrated (Basu 1996). Furthermore, 
the possible food price increases already constitute an operational concern in a protracted refugee situation.  
A second risk in the humanitarian context is related to the fungible nature of cash-based interventions, 
which may be diverted with less difficulty than food aid by armed groups in conflict-prone areas. Vouchers 
18 Another type of intervention is the provision of economic and educational activities within refugee settings, which has 
been implemented by nongovernmental organizations and mainline refugee agencies such as the United Nations Relief and 
Works Agency. These interventions allow refugees to maintain a basic livelihood as well as obtain livelihood skills that they 
can use later, upon eventual repatriation. However, these interventions might incur long-run costs inasmuch as they 
provide refugees incentives to remain in the host countries, thereby reinforcing the persistence of protracted refugee 
situations.  
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may constitute an interesting alternative in more fragile environments. UNHCR (2012a) already has experience 
with cash-based interventions in a wide range of countries, targeted to refugees with a particular focus on 
returnees (for example, in Chad, DRC, Jordan, Kenya, Pakistan, and Tanzania), IDPs (in Darfur and Somalia), and 
in limited cases, the host population (for example, in Lebanon). However, little is known about the relative 
efficiency of the interventions, which would require making the different modalities fully comparable in terms 
of program design, magnitude of transfers, and frequency of transfers (Hidrobo et al. 2014), while scaling up 
such interventions to the local hosts imposes an additional challenge of targeting the most in need among the 
host population. The randomized evaluation that Hidrobo and colleagues (2014) implemented in Ecuador 
provides certainly an interesting benchmark for future studies on the subject (Bailey 2013). Hidrobo and others 
(2014) indeed found that the quantity and quality of food consumed has improved under all modalities (cash, 
food, or vouchers) but food transfers led to larger increases in calories consumed while vouchers did much 
more to improve dietary diversity among both Columbian refugees and Ecuadorian hosts. Assessing the 
external validity of this study, in particular in rural and camp settings, would pave the way for more resilience-
enhancing policies in protracted refugee situations. Despite the extensive review by Bailey (2013) and with a 
few exceptions (Aker 2013; Hoddinott, Sandström, and Upton 2013; Schwab, Margolies, and Hoddinott 2013; 
Hidrobo et al. 2014), we should acknowledge that “most evaluations of humanitarian assistance are not 
rigorous by academic research standards and are done with limited time and resources” (Bailey 2013, 4). Little 
is also known about the potential impact of hybrid interventions such as combining monetization, cash 
transfers, and public works programs that build infrastructure and human capital as well as include both 
refugees and the poor in the host community. All in all, the effects of different types and combinations of 
humanitarian aid on food security and resilience in host-community settings are not well understood and need 
much more research.  
Whether food aid is procured locally, regionally, or from overseas is another aspect of food aid that has 
been debated in terms of its implications for food security of the host community, in both the short run and 
the long run. If food aid is imported from overseas and is not procured from local markets, it may reduce the 
incentives for farm production in the long run, thereby hampering the ability of the host community to 
transition from humanitarian aid to development. This generic effect of overseas imported food aid is 
reinforced in refugee settings because food production is often hampered by conflict and lack of security, and 
by the lack of production capacity and price incentives once the security conditions improve. Therefore the 
provision of food aid sourced from overseas may have less of an adverse effect in the short run, up to the 
point where conflict has abated. It may thus be advisable to phase out procurement of food aid from overseas 
and build capacity for agricultural production and marketing in the host community as security conditions 
improve, contingent on monitoring and evaluation of food production and of consumption requirements. This 
strategy emphasizes the dynamic nature of host-community settings and the need to set up surveillance 
monitoring and evaluation systems that can help inform decisionmakers on when to transition from one policy 
instrument to the other. Researchers also need to take these dynamics into consideration as they evaluate 
impacts of different types of food aid in refugee settings.  
Related to the issue of food aid procurement is the geography of the host community. Recent work 
suggests that in coastal geographies there may be little difference in delivery time between food aid procured 
from overseas and that procured regionally. Significant differences are found only in landlocked settings, with 
local procurement significantly improving time frames of food aid delivery (Lentz, Passarelli, and Barrett 2013). 
Cost-effectiveness considerations are also important and suggest that local procurement may be cheaper. 
However, there are concerns that locally procured food aid is often unsafe and of lower quality. Thus, 
concurrently building capacity and upgrading regional food systems may yield greater benefits in the long term 
for food security in host communities. Simultaneously developing markets and road infrastructure may 
generate greater long-term benefits for the host community. However, there is limited empirical analysis of 
these approaches specifically in refugee settings. 
Building the evidence base on effective strategies to enhance resilience and food security in host 
communities should be central in moving the agenda forward. The current lack of research means policy 
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decisions may not always have been based on evidence. Thus a more open and collaborative framework is 
needed that includes policymakers, development practitioners, and researchers to generate the evidence base 
for enhancing food security and resilience in host communities. Through research evidence and practice, 
UNHCR has realized the importance of refugee impacts on the hosting population and thus now implements 
programs (in coordination with others, such as the United Nations Development Programme) designed to 
minimize the negative impacts. For instance, in Tanzania, as a result of the problems that occurred in the 
district of Karagwe following the return of refugees to Rwanda in 1996, UNHCR and its partners implemented a 
joint program in 2008 in the framework of the UN’s Delivering as One program to ease the transition in host 
communities following the repatriation of Burundi refugees from the district of Ngara.19 
In some respects UNHCR (with WFP) has shown remarkable efficiency in addressing the challenges of 
protecting and supporting refugees and other groups or populations of concern. But more collaboration with 
other stakeholders is sorely needed. Based on our assessment, we come to the conclusion that innovative 
collaborations are essential in thinking about protracted refugee situations and their implications for food 
security in the host community. To some extent the problem is that protracted refugee situations have been 
the mandate of the UNHCR, which is already overstretched. Therefore the food-security challenge in 
protracted refugee situations should be seen as a long-term development challenge that calls for the 
engagement of other organizations and development approaches often applied in international organizations 
such as the United Nations Development Programme, Food and Agriculture Organization, World Bank, and 
other development agencies operating at national and regional levels. In our view, it is unrealistic to expect the 
UNHCR to take up the additional responsibility of implementing food-security and development programs for 
refugee host communities, and therefore innovative interorganizational collaborations may offer better 
results. It may be necessary to find an alternative agency or an institutional innovation that is separate from 
the UNHCR but coordinates closely with it to ensure effective transition from humanitarian aid to 
development. This institutional innovation that we propose requires coordination in partnership, and various 
models may have to be experimented with and tested to figure out what works. More research is certainly 
needed in that respect. 
 
 
  
19 For more details, see www.unhcr.org/print/4857de172.html.  
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5. CONCLUSION: MOVING THE RESEARCH AGENDA ON RESILIENCE FORWARD 
An emerging literature addresses the impacts of refugees on host communities, in particular through the 
goods and labor markets, as well as on health. However, our understanding of the impact of refugees on food 
security in host communities is in its infancy and requires pushing the resilience agenda forward in several 
directions while conducting research on these multiple areas. Based on the review of literature, the main 
conclusions that we draw about moving the resilience and food-security agenda forward in refugee settings 
can be summarized into the following: 
Most analyses have focused on one particular sector or impact channel (for example, health). However, a 
more comprehensive or holistic view is needed. As demonstrated in the framework presented in this 
paper (Figure 3.1), the issue is complex given the multiple and indirect channels through which refugees 
can affect food security in host communities. As pointed out in the literature review, the impacts are also 
likely to change over time and space, and they have important distributional consequences. The 
complexity of the impacts calls for more complementary and integrative research approaches including 
the innovative use of qualitative and quantitative research methods. 
This review paper also sheds light on the paucity of evidence on the three main solutions to protracted 
refugee situations that UNHCR has used in most of its activities. Weighing the costs and benefits of each 
policy option and the respective impacts on food security requires a better understanding of the general 
impacts of these options on both the host population and the refugees’ countries of origin. There is 
particular need to pay more attention to the consequences on the local communities of repatriation and 
integration of refugees or IDPs, which seem to have strong linkages with the food security of the host 
community. In addition, these options are argued to have been implemented without enough 
consideration of the long-term implications for the host communities. Beyond these interventions, we also 
need to open the door to hybrid approaches to dealing with the food-security problem in refugee 
situations, which have emerged more recently and incorporate more explicitly the concept of resilience 
and the notion of transitioning from refugee assistance to development. For instance, we still know very 
little about the relative efficiency of different interventions, such as conditional or unconditional cash, 
voucher, or food transfers, or their combination, in protracted refugee situations. Similarly, the impacts of 
infrastructure investments that take place in refugee situations and their implications for food security in 
the long run need to be understood to inform the possible approaches to linking humanitarian aid and 
development. 
Due to data availability, many quantitative studies have focused on Tanzania; however, Tanzania might be 
a peculiar case. The case study of Dadaab offers additional evidence that some of the economic 
mechanisms found in Tanzania may be generalizable in other socioeconomic contexts, but the literature 
remains geographically too limited to allow for general conclusions. This certainly calls for additional case 
studies from other regions (for example, Syrian refugees in Jordan, Iraq, Turkey, or Lebanon, and Afghan 
refugees in Pakistan), studies contrasting the differential impact that could be hypothesized between 
refugees and IDPs, and studies of other refugee accommodation types (for example, camps versus self-
settlement approaches).  
The literature appears to be divided between assessing impacts on refugees and assessing impacts on the 
local hosts. Our literature review indicates that the quality of interactions between refugees and hosts 
largely determines outcomes in the way different interventions may operate among these two groups 
(such as food versus cash, education, employment, and so on). For example, targeting one group has 
indirect welfare implications for the other, and understanding this interaction is certainly a promising area 
of research. A better understanding of the social interaction and perceptions between refugees and local 
hosts, and the disparities between the two groups, could offer innovations in the attempt to employ local 
integration as a viable policy option. For example, the level of trust or social cohesion versus tension has 
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been reportedly affected by structural changes in the local economy induced by refugee inflows and 
associated humanitarian interventions and government policies. Understanding how social constructs 
such as mistrust or tensions may change due to the advent of refugees and associated policies or 
interventions can be integral in enhancing resilience to conflict in the local communities and hence food 
security. 
Finally, a more practical knowledge gap is figuring out how to align the incentives of policymakers, 
practitioners, and researchers. The urgent nature of the humanitarian activities often conflicts with time and 
control requirements that are inherent in high-quality research. Preparation of fast-track research in close 
collaboration with implementing partners (WFP, UNHCR) would be programmatically favorable but may not 
yield the needed rigor for empirical evidence to better inform policies and programs in the long run. Thus 
greater collaboration between researchers and practitioners is needed and requires strong institutional 
partnerships to enable collaboration and long-term commitment by all stakeholders. This cooperation is 
urgently needed if significant improvements are to be realized in enhancing resilience and transitioning from 
humanitarian refugee assistance to development. 
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APPENDIX 
Figure A.1 Refugees by destination and dietary energy supply per capita, 1995 
 
Source: FAO (1996) with data from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. 
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Figure A.2 Refugees by destination and Global Hunger Index, 2012 
 
Source: UNHCR (2012b) and von Grebmer et al. (2013). Missing data for GHI are reported in 2013 for Afghanistan, Bahrain, 
Bhutan, Democratic Republic of Congo, Iraq, Myanmar, Oman, Papua New Guinea, Qatar, and Somalia. 
Note: GHI = Global Hunger Index. 
  
28 
 
REFERENCES 
ACTED (Agency for Technical Cooperation and Development). 2013. Food Security Situation and Livelihood 
Intervention Opportunities for Syrian Refugees and Host Communities in North Jordan. Paris. 
Adelman, S., D. O. Gilligan, and K. Lehrer. 2010. “Childhood Interrupted: How Conflict-Induced Shocks Shape 
Human Capital Formation.” Unpublished. Washington DC: International Food Policy Research 
Institute. 
Aker, J. 2013. Cash or Coupons? Testing the Impacts of Cash versus Vouchers in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo. Working Paper 320. Washington, DC: Center for Global Development. 
Aklilu, Y., and A. Catley. 2009. Livestock Exports from the Horn of Africa: An Analysis of Benefits by Pastoralist 
Wealth Group and Policy Implications. Medford, MA, US: Feinstein International Center, Tufts 
University. 
Akokpari, J. K. 1998. “The State, Refugees and Migration in Sub-Saharan Africa.” International Migration 36 (2): 
211–234. 
Alix-Garcia, J., and A. Bartlett. 2012. “Occupations under Fire: The Labor Market in a Complex Emergency.” 
Unpublished, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics, University of Wisconsin, Madison. 
Alix-Garcia, J., A. Bartlett, and D. Saah. 2012. “Displaced Populations, Humanitarian Assistance and Hosts: A 
Framework for Analyzing Impacts on Semi-urban Households.” World Development 40 (2): 373–386. 
———. 2013. “The Landscape of Conflict: IDPs, Aid and Land-Use Change in Darfur.” Journal of Economic 
Geography 13 (4): 589–617. 
Alix-Garcia, J., and D. Saah. 2010. “The Effect of Refugee Inflows on Host Communities: Evidence from 
Tanzania.” World Bank Economic Review 24 (1): 148–170. 
Atkin, D. 2013. “Trade, Tastes and Nutrition in India.” American Economic Review 103 (5): 1629–1663.  
Baez, J. E. 2011. “Civil Wars beyond Their Borders: The Human Capital and Health Consequences of Hosting 
Refugees.” Journal of Development Economics 96 (2): 391–408. doi:10.1016/j.jdeveco.2010.08.011. 
Bailey, S. 2013. The Impact of Cash Transfers on Food Consumption in Humanitarian Settings: A Review of 
Evidence. Winnipeg: Canadian Foodgrains Bank. 
Bailey, S., K. Savage, and S. O’Callaghan. 2008. Cash Transfers in Emergencies: A Synthesis of World Vision’s 
Experience and Learning. Middlesex, UK: World Vision International. 
Ballentine, K., and J. Sherman. 2003. The Political Economy of Armed Conflict: Beyond Greed and Grievance. 
Boulder, CO, US: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Barreca, A. I., P. V. Fishback, and S. Kantor. 2012. “Agricultural Policy, Migration, and Malaria in the United 
States in the 1930s.” Explorations in Economic History 49 (4): 381–398. 
Barrett, C. B., and D. Maxwell. 2005. Food Aid after Fifty Years: Recasting Its Role. New York: Routledge. 
Basu, K. 1996. “Relief Programs: When It May Be Better to Give Food Instead of Cash.” World Development 24 
(1): 91–96. 
Beegle, K. 2005. “Labor Effects of Adult Mortality in Tanzanian Households.” Economic Development and 
Cultural Change 53 (3): 655–683. 
Beegle, K., J. De Weerdt, and S. Dercon. 2006. Kagera Health and Development Survey 2004 Basic Information 
Document. Washington, DC: The World Bank. 
Berry, L. 2008. “The Impacts of Environmental Degradation on Refugee-Host Relationships.” African Security 
Studies 17 (3): 125–131. 
29 
 
Black, R. 2001. Environmental Refugees: Myth or Reality? Geneva: United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees. 
Blattman, C., and E. Miguel. 2010. “Civil War.” Journal of Economic Literature 48 (1): 3–57. 
Bohnet, H. 2012. “Large Refugee Populations, Resource Scarcity and Conflict.” Paper presented at annual 
conference of the European Political Science Association, Berlin, June 21–23. 
Bosker, M., and H. Garretsen. 2009. “Economic Development and the Geography of Institutions.” Journal of 
Economic Geography 9 (3): 295–328. 
Breisinger, C., E. Ecker, P. Al-Riffai, and B. Yu. 2012. Policies and Investments for Poverty Reduction and Food 
Security. Food Policy Report 25. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
Buhaug, H., S. Gates, and P. Lujala. 2009. “Geography, Rebel Capability, and the Duration of Civil Conflict.” 
Journal of Conflict Resolution 53 (4): 544–569. 
Büscher, K., and K. Vlassenroot. 2010. “Humanitarian Presence and Urban Development: New Opportunities 
and Contrasts in Goma, DRC.” Disasters 34 (s2): S256–S273. 
Chambers, R. 1986. “Hidden Losers? The Impact of Rural Refugees and Refugee Programs on Poorer Hosts.” 
International Migration Review 20 (2): 245–263. 
Collier, P., and A. Hoeffler. 2004. “Greed and Grievance in Civil War.” Oxford Economic Papers 56 (4): 563–595. 
Collier, P., and D. Rohner. 2008. “Democracy, Development, and Conflict.” Journal of the European Economic 
Association 6 (2–3): 531–540. 
Coly, A. N., J. Milet, A. Diallo, T. Ndiaye, E. Benefice, F. Simondon, S. Wade, and K. B. Simondon. 2006. 
“Preschool Stunting, Adolescent Migration, Catch-Up Growth, and Adult Height in Young Senegalese 
Men and Women of Rural Origin.” Journal of Nutrition 136 (9): 2412–2420. 
Craig, M. H., R. W. Snow, and D. le Sueur. 1999. “A Climate-Based Distribution Model of Malaria Transmission 
in Sub-Saharan Africa.” Parasitology Today 15 (3): 105–111. 
Crisp, J. 2010. “Forced Displacement in Africa: Dimensions, Difficulties and Policy Directions.” Refugee Survey 
Quarterly 29:1–27. 
Czaika, M., and A. Mayer. 2011. “Refugee Movements and Aid Responsiveness of Bilateral Donors.” Journal of 
Development Studies 47 (3): 455–474. 
de Waal, A. 1997. Famine Crimes: Politics and the Disaster Relief Industry in Africa. Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press. 
del Ninno, C., P. A. Dorosh, and K. Subbarao. 2007. “Food Aid, Domestic Policy and Food Security: Contrasting 
Experiences from South Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa.” Food Policy 32 (4): 413–435. 
De Weerdt, J., K. Beegle, H. B. Lilleør, S. Dercon, K. Hirvonen, M. Kirchberger, and S. Krutikova. 2012. Kagera 
Health and Development Survey 2010: Basic Information Document. Study Paper 46. Copenhagen: The 
Rockwool Foundation Research Unit. 
Dorosh, P., H. G. Wang, L. You, and E. Schmidt. 2012. “Road Connectivity, Population, and Crop Production in 
Sub-Saharan Africa.” Agricultural Economics 43 (1): 89–103. 
Duflo, E. 2012. “Women’s Empowerment and Economic Development.” Journal of Economic Literature 50 (4): 
1051–1079. 
Ecker, O., and C. Breisinger. 2012. The Food Security System: A New Conceptual Framework. Discussion Paper 
01166. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
Fan, S., P. Hazell, and S. Thorat. 2000. “Government Spending, Growth and Poverty in Rural India.” American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 82 (4): 1038–1051. 
30 
 
FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). 1996. World Food Summit: Synthesis of the Technical Background 
Documents. Rome. www.fao.org/docrep/003/w2537e/w2537e00.HTM.  
———. 2006. Food Security. Policy Brief 2. Rome.  
———. 2013. Crop Prospects and Food Situation. Rome. 
Fearon, J. D., and D. D. Laitin. 2003. “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War.” American Political Science Review 97 
(1): 75–90. 
———. 2011. “Sons of the Soil, Migrants, and Civil War.” World Development 39 (2): 199–211. 
Fiala, N. 2012. The Economic Consequences of Forced Displacement. Brighton, UK: Households in Conflict 
Network. 
Fisk, K. 2012. “Do Refugees Trigger Conflict? Evaluating the Influence of Refugee Location on the Diffusion of 
Violence in Host Countries.” Paper prepared for annual meeting of the American Political Science 
Association, New Orleans, August 29–September 2. 
Gallup, J. L., and J. D. Sachs. 2000. “The Economic Burden of Malaria.” American Journal of Tropical Medicine 
and Hygiene 64 (1–2 Suppl): 85–96. 
GHA (Global Humanitarian Assistance). 2012. Tracking Spending on Cash Transfer Programming in a 
Humanitarian Context: Briefing. Bristol, UK. www.globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/03/cash-transfer-financing-final.pdf. 
Gleditsch, N. P. 1998. “Armed Conflict and the Environment: A Critique of the Literature.” Journal of Peace 
Research 35 (3): 381–400. 
Goldsmith, P. 2013. “The Future of Pastoralist Conflict in the Horn of Africa.” Pastoralism and Development in 
Africa: Dynamic Change at the Margins, edited by A. Catley, J. Lind, and I. Scoones, 131–142. New 
York: Routledge. 
Goyens, P., D. Porignon, E. M. Soron’gane, R. Tonglet, P. Hennart, and H. L. Vis. 1996. “Humanitarian Aid and 
Health Services in Eastern Kivu, Zaïre: Collaboration or Competition?” Journal of Refugee Studies 9 (3): 
268–280. 
Hatton, T. J., and J. G. Williamson. 2003. “Demographic and Economic Pressure on Emigration out of Africa.” 
Scandinavian Journal of Economics 105 (3): 465–486. 
Headey, D., and A. Kennedy. 2012. Enhancing Resilience in the Horn of Africa: Synthesis of an Evidence-Based 
Workshop. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
www.ifpri.org/sites/default/files/publications/cp_hornofafrica.pdf.  
Hendrix, C., and H.-J. Brinkman. 2013. “Food Insecurity and Conflict Dynamics: Causal Linkages and Complex 
Feedbacks.” Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 2 (2): 26. 
doi:10.5334/sta.bm. 
Hidrobo, M., J. Hoddinott, A. Peterman, A. Margolies, and V. Moreira. 2014. “Cash, Food, or Vouchers? 
Evidence from a Randomized Experiment in Northern Ecuador.” Journal of Development Economics 
107:144–156. 
Hirvonen, K. 2014. “Measuring Catch-Up Growth in Malnourished Populations.” Annals of Human Biology 41 
(1): 67–75. doi:10.3109/03014460.2013.827239. 
Hoddinott, J. 2012. “Agriculture, Health, and Nutrition: Toward Conceptualizing the Linkages.” In Reshaping 
Agriculture for Nutrition and Health: An IFPRI 2020 Book, edited by S. Fan and R. Pandya-Lorch, 13–20. 
Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
31 
 
Hoddinott, J., S. Sandström, and J. Upton. 2013. Impact Evaluation of Cash and Food Transfers in Zinder, Niger: 
Analytical Report. Rome: World Food Programme. 
http://documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/resources/wfp257676.pdf.  
Homer-Dixon, T. F. 1999. Environment, Scarcity, and Violence. Princeton, NJ, US: Princeton University Press. 
Hsiang, S. M., M. Burke, and E. Miguel. 2013. “Quantifying the Influence of Climate on Human Conflict.” 
Science 341 (6151): 1235367. doi:10.1126/science.1235367.  
Hynes, M., M. Sheik, H. G. Wilson, and P. Spiegel. 2002. “Reproductive Health Indicators and Outcomes among 
Refugee and Internally Displaced Persons in Postemergency Phase Camps.” Journal of the American 
Medical Association 288 (5): 595–603. 
Ibáñez, A. M., and A. Moya. 2010. “Vulnerability of Victims of Civil Conflicts: Empirical Evidence for the 
Displaced Population in Colombia.” World Development 38 (4): 647–663. 
Ibáñez, A. M., and C. E. Vélez. 2008. “Civil Conflict and Forced Migration: The Micro Determinants and Welfare 
Losses of Displacement in Colombia.” World Development 36 (4): 659–676. 
Jacobsen, K. 1997. “Refugees’ Environmental Impact: The Effect of Patterns of Settlement.” Journal of Refugee 
Studies 10 (1): 19–36. 
———. 1999. A “Safety-First” Approach to Physical Protection in Refugee Camps. Working Paper 4. Cambridge: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology Center for International Studies. 
———. 2000. “A Framework for Exploring the Political and Security Context of Refugee Populated Areas.” 
Refugee Survey Quarterly 19 (1): 3–22. 
———. 2002. “Can Refugees Benefit the State? Refugee Resources and African Statebuilding.” Journal of 
Modern African Studies 40 (4): 577–596. 
Jacoby, H. G., and B. Minten. 2009. “On Measuring the Benefits of Lower Transport Costs.” Journal of 
Development Economics 89 (1): 28–38. 
Jaspars, S., P. Harvey, C. Hudspeth, L. Rumble, and D. Christensen. 2007. A Review of UNICEF’s Role in Cash 
Transfers to Emergency-Affected Populations. Working Paper. New York: UNICEF Office of Emergency 
Programmes. 
Johnson, R. N., and G. D. Libecap. 1982. “Contracting Problems and Regulation: The Case of the Fishery.” The 
American Economic Review 72 (5): 1005–1022. 
Kalipeni, E., and J. Oppong. 1998. “The Refugee Crisis in Africa and Implications for Health and Disease: A 
Political Ecology Approach.” Social Science and Medicine 46 (12): 1637–1653. 
Kazmi, J. H., and K. Pandit. 2001. “Disease and Dislocation: The Impact of Refugee Movements on the 
Geography of Malaria in NWFP, Pakistan.” Social Science and Medicine 52 (7): 1043–1055. 
Keen, D. 1998. The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars. Adelphi Paper 320. London: International 
Institute for Strategic Studies.  
———.2008. Complex Emergencies. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press. 
Kibreab, G. 1997. “Environmental Causes and Impact of Refugee Movements: A Critique of the Current 
Debate.” Disasters 21 (1): 20–38. 
Kirwan, B. E., and M. McMillan. 2007. “Food Aid and Poverty.” American Journal of Agricultural Economics 89 
(5): 1152–1160. 
Kondylis, F. 2008. “Agricultural Outputs and Conflict Displacement: Evidence from a Policy Intervention in 
Rwanda.” Economic Development and Cultural Change 57 (1): 31–66. 
32 
 
Kreibaum, M. 2013. “Their Suffering, Our Burden? How Congolese Refugees Affect the Ugandan Population.” 
Paper presented at Households in Conflict Network workshop, Berkeley, CA, US, November 20–22. 
Landau, L. B. 2004. “Challenge without Transformation: Refugees, Aid and Trade in Western Tanzania.” Journal 
of Modern African Studies 42 (1): 31–59. 
Lawrie, N., and W. Van Damme. 2003. “The Importance of Refugee-Host Relations: Guinea 1990–2003.” Lancet 
362 (9383): 575. 
Lentz, E. C., C. B. Barrett, M. I. Gómez, and D. G. Maxwell. 2013. “On the Choice and Impacts of Innovative 
International Food Assistance Instruments.” World Development 49:1–8. 
Lentz, E. C., S. Passarelli, and C. B. Barrett. 2013. “The Timeliness and Cost-Effectiveness of the Local and 
Regional Procurement of Food Aid.” World Development 49:9–18. 
Majid, N., and S. McDowell. 2012. “Hidden Dimensions of the Somalia Famine.” Global Food Security 1 (1): 36–
42. 
Marchiori, L., J.-F. Maystadt, and I. Schumacher. 2013. Is Environmentally-Induced Income Variability a Driver 
of Migration? A Macroeconomic Perspective. Working Paper 2013-17. Paris: IPAG Business School. 
Margolies, A., and J. Hoddinott. 2012. Mapping the Impacts of Food Aid: Current Knowledge and Future 
Directions. Working Paper 2012/34. Helsinki: United Nations University World Institute for 
Development Economics Research. 
Martin, A. 2005. “Environmental Conflict between Refugee and Host Communities.” Journal of Peace Research 
42 (3): 329–346. 
Maystadt, J.-F. 2011. Poverty Reduction in a Refugee-Hosting Economy: A Natural Experiment. Discussion Paper 
01132. Washington, DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
Maystadt, J.-F., and G. Duranton. 2013. “The Development Push of Refugees: Evidence from Tanzania.” Paper 
presented at Households in Conflict Network workshop, Berkeley, CA, US, November 20–22. 
Maystadt, J.-F., and P. Verwimp. Forthcoming. “Winners and Losers among a Refugee-Hosting Population.” 
Economic Development and Cultural Change. 
Menkhaus, K. 2012. “No Access: Critical Bottlenecks in the 2011 Somali Famine.” Global Food Security 1 (1): 
29–35. 
Milner, J., and G. Loescher. 2004. “Protracted Refugee Situations and State and Regional Insecurity.” Conflict, 
Security and Development 4 (1): 3–20. 
Montalvo, J. G., and M. Reynal-Querol. 2007. “Fighting against Malaria: Prevent Wars While Waiting for the 
‘Miraculous’ Vaccine.” Review of Economics and Statistics 89 (1): 165–177. 
Moore, W. H., and S. M. Shellman. 2007. “Whither Will They Go? A Global Study of Refugees’ Destinations, 
1965–1995.” International Studies Quarterly 51 (4): 811–834. 
Morel, M. 2009. “The Lack of Refugee Burden-Sharing in Tanzania: Tragic Effects.” Africa Focus 22 (1): 107–
114. 
Ndege, L. J., B. S. Piters, A. Nyanga, and L. Ngimbwa. 1995. Tanzania/Netherlands Farming Systems Research 
Project, Lake Zone: Diagnostic Survey of Karagwe District. Karagwe, Tanzania: Karagwe District Rural 
Development Programme. 
NORDECO (Nordic Agency for Development and Ecology). 2010. In Search of Protection and Livelihoods: Socio-
economic and Environmental Impacts of Dadaab Refugee Camps on Host Communities. Copenhagen.  
Orach, C. G., and V. De Brouwere. 2004. “Postemergency Health Services for Refugee and Host Populations in 
Uganda, 1999–2002.” Lancet 364 (9434): 611–612. 
33 
 
Pieters, H., A. Guariso, and A. Vandeplas. 2013. Conceptual Framework for the Analysis of the Determinants of 
Food and Nutrition Security. Working Paper 13. The Hague: FoodSecure. 
Porignon, D., J.-P. Noterman, P. Hennart, R. Tonglet, G. Soron, E. Mugisho, and T. E. Lokombe. 1995. “The Role 
of the Zairian Health Services in the Rwandan Refugee Crisis.” Disasters 19 (4): 356–360. 
Prentice, A. M., K. A. Ward, G. R. Goldberg, L. M. Jarjou, S. E. Moore, A. J. Fulford, and A. Prentice. 2013. 
“Critical Windows for Nutritional Interventions against Stunting.” American Journal of Clinical 
Nutrition 97 (5): 911–918. 
Prunier, G. 2008. Africa’s World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental 
Catastrophe. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Rahim, A. A., D. Jaimovich, and A. Ylönen. 2013. Forced Displacement and Behavioral Change: An Empirical 
Study of Returnee Households in the Nuba Mountains. Working Paper 157. Brighton, UK: Households 
in Conflict Network. 
Regan, P. M. 2002. Civil Wars and Foreign Powers: Outside Intervention in Intrastate Conflict. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press. 
Regan, P. M., and A. C. Stam. 2000. “In the Nick of Time: Conflict Management, Mediation Timing, and the 
Duration of Interstate Disputes.” International Studies Quarterly 44 (2): 239–260. 
Robeyns, I. 2006. “Three Models of Education Rights, Capabilities and Human Capital.” Theory and Research in 
Education 4 (1): 69–84. 
Ruegger, S., and H. Bohnet. 2011. “Refugees, Conflict and Ethnic Power Relations.” Paper presented at 
American Political Science Association annual meeting, Seattle, WA, US, September 1–4. 
Ruel, M., and J. Hoddinott. 2008. Investing in Early Childhood Nutrition. Policy Brief 8. Washington, DC: 
International Food Policy Research Institute. 
Ruiz, I., and C. Vargas-Silva. 2013. “The Economics of Forced Migration.” Journal of Development Studies 49 (6): 
772–784. 
Rutinwa, B., and K. Kamanga. 2003. Impact of Refugees in Northwestern Tanzania. Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: 
Center for Study of Forced Migration. 
Salehyan, I., and K. S. Gleditsch. 2006. “Refugees and the Spread of Civil War.” International Organization 60 
(2): 335–366. 
Schwab, B., A. Margolies, and J. Hoddinott. 2013. Impact Evaluation of Cash and Food Transfers for the 
Seasonal Emergency Safety Net in Hajjah and Ibb Governorates: Yemen Endline Report. Washington, 
DC: International Food Policy Research Institute. 
Schwartz, D. M., T. Deligiannis, and T. F. Homer-Dixon. 2000. “Commentary: Debating Environment, 
Population, and Conflict.” Environmental Change and Security Project Report 6:77–94. 
Shroff, M. R., P. L. Griffiths, C. Suchindran, B. Nagalla, S. Vazir, and M. E. Bentley. 2011. “Does Maternal 
Autonomy Influence Feeding Practices and Infant Growth in Rural India?” Social Science and Medicine 
73 (3): 447–455. 
Singh, I., L. Squire, and J. Strauss. 1986. “The Basic Model: Theory, Empirical Results, and Policy Conclusions.” 
Agricultural Household Models: Extensions, Applications, and Policy, edited by I. Singh, L. Squire, and  
J. Strauss, 17–47. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 
Stavenhagen, R. 1996. Ethnic Conflicts and the Nation-State. London: Macmillan. 
Tschirley, D. L., and A. M. del Castillo. 2007. Local and Regional Food Aid Procurement: An Assessment of 
Experience in Africa and Elements of Good Donor Practice. Food Security International Development 
34 
 
Working Paper 54562. East Lansing: Michigan State University Department of Agricultural, Food, and 
Resource Economics. 
UNEP (United Nations Environmental Programme). 2005. Impacts of Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons 
on the Environment in Tanzania. Geneva: UNEP Division of Environmental Policy Implementation. 
UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees). 2007. Statistical Yearbook 2007. Geneva. 
———. 2012a. An Introduction to Cash-Based Interventions in UNHCR Operations. Geneva: UNHCR Division of 
Programme Support and Management. www.unhcr.org/515a959e9.html. 
———. 2012b. Statistical Yearbook 2012. Geneva. 
UNRWA (United Nations Relief and Works Agency). 2011. Sustaining Change. Amman, Jordan: UNRWA Relief 
and Social Services Department. www.unrwa.org/userfiles/201201154647.pdf. 
Van Damme, W. 1995. “Do Refugees Belong in Camps? Experiences from Goma and Guinea.” Lancet 346 
(8971): 360–362. 
Van Damme, W., V. De Brouwere, M. Boelaert, and W. Van Lerberghe. 1998. “Effects of a Refugee-Assistance 
Programme on Host Population in Guinea as Measured by Obstetric Interventions.” Lancet 351 
(9116): 1609–1613. 
Verwimp, P., and J. C. Muñoz-Mora. 2013. Returning Home after Civil War: Food Security, Nutrition and Poverty 
among Burundian Households. Working Paper 123. Brighton, UK: Households in Conflict Network. 
von Grebmer, K., D. Headey, C. Béné, L. Haddad, T. Olofinbiyi, D. Wiesmann, H. Fritschel, S. Yin, Y. Yohannes, C. 
Foley, C. von Oppeln, and B. Iseli. 2013. 2013 Global Hunger Index: The Challenge of Hunger: Building 
Resilience to Achieve Food and Nutrition Security. Bonn: Welthungerhilfe; Washington, DC: 
International Food Policy Research Institute; Dublin: Concern Worldwide.  
Vosti, S. A. 1990. “Malaria among Gold Miners in Southern Para, Brazil: Estimates of Determinants and 
Individual Costs.” Social Science and Medicine 30 (10): 1097–1105. 
Werker, E. 2007. “Refugee Camp Economies.” Journal of Refugee Studies 20 (3): 461–480. 
WFP (World Food Programme). 2011. Ivorian Refugee Influx and Food Security: Nimba Refugee Assessment. 
Rome. 
———. 2013a. Syrian Refugees and Food Insecurity in Iraq, Jordan and Turkey: Secondary Literature and Data 
Desk Review. Rome. 
———. 2013b. Syrian Refugees and Food Insecurity in Lebanon: Secondary Literature and Data Desk Review. 
Rome. 
Whitaker, B. E. 2002. “Refugees in Western Tanzania: The Distribution of Burdens and Benefits among Local 
Hosts.” Journal of Refugee Studies 15 (4): 339–358. 
White, H., and H. Waddington. 2012. “Why Do We Care about Evidence Synthesis? An Introduction to the 
Special Issue on Systematic Reviews.” Journal of Development Effectiveness 4 (3): 351–358. 
World Bank. 2011. World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development. Washington, DC. 
———. 2013. World Development Indicators database. Accessed on November 20. 
http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicators.  
Zetter, R. 1995. “Incorporation and Exclusion: The Life Cycle of Malawi’s Refugee Assistance Program.” World 
Development 23 (10): 1653–1667. 
 
 
35 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
36 
 
